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Abstract 
Drawing Borders: The Political and Symbolic Importance of the United States in 
the Creation of Czechoslovakia 
 
by Samantha Borgeson 
In 2011, a statue of Woodrow Wilson, based on the original erected in 
1928, was re-installed at Woodrow Wilson Train Station in the capital of the 
Czech Republic.  The original statue commemorated Wilson's involvement in the 
creation of interwar Czechoslovakia, and his support for its independence.  It 
also symbolized the democratic ideals which brought the two nations together 
following the Great War.  Woodrow Wilson played a major part in the history and 
memory of Czechs during their formative years of their state following World War 
I, a role which has not been forgotten.  Today the Wilson statue is the site of 
ongoing political and national memory construction revealing the multi-layered 
aspects of   Czech national identity and politics.   
There are three main components to the Czech-American relationship: 
the importance of the Czech argument of historic right to land, the role of 
Czech and Slovak immigrant groups in the United States in pressuring the Wilson 
Administration, and Wilson’s worldview and idea of national self-determination 
Often interdependent, these three themes help explain the dual founding 
fathers myth of Czechoslovakia of Wilson and Masaryk, as well as the 
importance of this relationship in the present.   
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Introduction: Wilson’s Influence and Memory 
 
In 2011, a statue of Woodrow Wilson, based on the original erected in 
1928, was re-installed at Woodrow Wilson Train Station in the capital of the 
Czech Republic. The original statue commemorated Wilson's involvement in the 
creation of interwar Czechoslovakia, and his support for its independence.  It 
also symbolized the democratic ideals which brought the two nations together 
following the Great War.  After the Czech state ceased to exist in 1939, the 
National Socialists occupation government led by Reinhard Heydrich destroyed 
the statue on December 12th, 1941.  Revealing the importance of the restoration 
of Wilson's statue in Prague, a Czech citizen declared, “Bringing President Wilson 
back to Central Europe is historic, and symbolic.  It underscores the ‘rule of law’ 
and the Western style of democracy that started in 1918 in this part of the 
world.”1  This sentiment demonstrates that the symbol of Wilson continues to 
resonate throughout Czech society today.  Indeed, throughout the new Czech 
Republic, there are numerous monuments, streets, train stations, and squares 
named after the American president.   Woodrow Wilson played a major part in 
the history and memory of Czechs during their formative years of their state 
                                                           
1 Eileen Daday, “Local Czechs Proud of Wilson Statue,” The Daily Herald, October 8, 2011. 
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following World War I, a role which has not been forgotten.  Today the Wilson 
statue is the site of ongoing political and national memory construction 
revealing the multi-layered aspects of   Czech national identity and politics.  An 
examination of the bond between Wilson and the Czechs reveals not only the 
deep connection between the former Czechoslovakia, the United States, and its 
former president to Czech history and identity but how these sites of memory 
continue to impact Czech foreign relations strategies and the special 
relationship between the United States and the Czech Republic.   
At the end of World War I the Habsburg Monarchy, which had ruled 
various parts of Europe for over 600 years, disintegrated and in the aftermath 
numerous different ethnic groups struggled to create and maintain successor-
states.  The champion of one of these states, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk of 
Czechoslovakia and later its first president, worked tirelessly during World War I to 
achieve recognition of this new state and support from the Allied powers.  The 
success of his goals for independence and security of specific borders hinged 
on both President Woodrow Wilson of the United States and fervent support from 
Czech and Slovak immigrant groups in America.  Masaryk’s realization of an 
independent homeland was contingent on the interlocking doctrines of   
Wilson’s principles of self-determination and democracy and Masaryk’s 
argument of historic and ethnic rights for the creation of a Czechoslovak state 
as well as the influence of immigrant groups in the United States.   
3 
 
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, several 
emerging nations employed history to legitimize border and statehood claims.  
Czechs employed an argument of historic right, among others, in order to 
establish (or re-establish according to this argument), a state with certain 
borders and on this basis they petitioned the Allied powers, including the United 
States, to accomplish this goal.  Woodrow Wilson’s policy of national self-
determination largely legitimized this argument of historic right, and gave 
Central European nations an international platform from which to justify their 
border and statehood claims.  The manipulation of the historical record to 
enhance one ethnic group over another led to unique characteristics in the 
emergence of new Central European states after 1919.  Some of these 
characteristics include continuing to manipulate history in order to achieve state 
goals in the present as well as history playing a role in governmental policy 
decisions.  The continuing importance of Wilson to the Czech Republic is a case 
in point. 
The influence of immigrants in the United States on American foreign 
policy and in the realization of Czechoslovak statehood in 1918 underpinned 
Wilson’s rhetoric of self-determination and overt support of the formation of a 
Czechoslovakian state.  These immigrants continued to support their former 
homelands by forming civil society groups and lobbying President Wilson on 
behalf of Czecho-Slovak independence.  Immigrant groups played an 
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important role in the early twentieth century and continue to influence United 
States foreign policy today. 
Along with President Wilson’s support and the impact of the immigrant 
Czech-Slovak immigrant societies, ties between the two countries were also 
forged on a more personal basis.   Tomáš Masaryk’s wife was from Brooklyn and 
he was a personal friend of Charles Crane, a wealthy American businessman, 
former diplomat and staunch supporter of Woodrow Wilson.   These political, 
societal, and personal ties proved to be the beginning of a long-term 
connection between the Czechs and Americans, kept alive by a celebration of 
shared democratic principles as well as by the immigrant heritage.  Many cities 
in the United States still retain a large number of self-conscious Bohemian and 
Moravian Czech descendants.  In addition, some still maintain close ties with the 
Czech Republic.  As recently as 2013, the Czech government gave the town of 
West, Texas, comprised of nearly 75% Czech descendants, $200,000 in order to 
rebuild its local sokol, or gymnasium, destroyed in  a fertilizer plant explosion.  
The explosion caught the attention of the Czech Republic and was all over 
Czech news stations at the time.  That the Czech government decided to 
donate this money to West represents importance of former immigrants to the 
Czech Republic as a means to continue nurturing good relations with the United 
States and with its former people.   
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Let me add here a few definitions for the sake of simplicity and continuity. 
Throughout the thesis, I use the term “Bohemian lands” to discuss the ethnically 
diverse region which includes Bohemia and Moravia; basically, the boundaries 
of today’s Czech Republic which encompasses almost the same territory as a 
tenth-century Bohemia.  The term Czecho-Slovak is used to discuss shared war 
aims before statehood, whereas Czechoslovakia refers to the state which 
existed from 1918 to 1993, excluding the time during the years of the Second 
World War when that state was divided, partitioned, and occupied by Nazi 
Germany and its allies. 
Although   a discussion of the Carpathian Rus or developments in Slovakia 
(aside from explaining how the Czechs framed the argument justifying the 
inclusion of Slovakia in a larger Czechoslovak state after World War I) will not be 
included in my discussion, this is not meant to diminish or marginalize their 
historical importance; they are topics best covered in another work.  In Slovakia 
in particular, the region had a separate and distinct set of historical 
circumstances which do not fit into the crafted Bohemian historical narrative; 
consequently, the border disputes between Czechoslovakia and Hungary will 
be omitted.     
There was a hope that a common Czecho-Slovak identity would 
eventually emerge.  However, both nationalism and conflicting interests 
prevented the two sides from coming to terms and eventually the country broke 
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apart in 1993.2  Czech nationalists had a Czechoslovak vision for the new state, 
and Slovak nationalists wanted exclusive home rule and independent 
government structures in their part of the new country.  To some extent, Slovaks 
did attain home rule; however, Czech nationals emerged victorious when 
reforms encouraged common national identity among Czechs and Slovaks 
during the First Republic of Czechoslovakia (1918-1938).  This difference of 
opinion on the new government caused deep divisions amongst leaders of the 
two groups which eventually led to the breakup of Czechoslovakia.3  
There are three main components to the Czech-American relationship 
which can help explain the influence and impact of the United States in the 
founding of Czechoslovakia.  The first theme is the importance of the Czech 
argument of historic right to land to convince the United States on the validity of 
Bohemian "historic nationhood."  The second component to understanding early 
US-Czech relations is the Czech and Slovak immigrant groups in the United 
States and their role in pressuring the Wilson Administration.  Finally, Wilson’s 
worldview on national self-determination that developed in the context of the 
violence and destruction of the Great War represents a key theme in 
uncovering US support for the Czechoslovak state. Often interdependent, these 
                                                           
2 On Czech-Slovak relations, see Carol Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation 
Versus State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997). 
3 Robert Henry Cox and Erich G. Frankland, “The Federal State and the Breakup of 
Czechoslovakia: An Institutional Analysis,” Publius 25, no 1 (Winter, 1995), 75-76. 
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three themes help explain the dual founding fathers myth of Czechoslovakia of 
Wilson and Masaryk, as well as the importance of this relationship in the present.   
Chapter One examines the first theme by exploring the Czech argument 
of historic right to contested land during and after World War I.  This argument 
was fundamental in convincing Woodrow Wilson and other Allied leaders to 
support the Czechs in their bid for independence and their claim for specific 
borders.  More importantly these historical arguments were fundamental to the 
formation of Czech nation-state ideology.  With the impending fall of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire the Czechs looked to the past, and specifically to the 
medieval and early modern Bohemian past, in order to legitimize their claims 
and assert political power. This chapter explores why these Czech nationalists 
looked to medieval and early modern history to uncover the arguments 
employed in 1919 to foster support for Czech statehood as it also delegitimized 
Habsburg claims. During World War I, Czech nationalists, who attempted to 
establish home rule under the Habsburg Empire in order to secure language 
rights began to utilize historic Bohemia to establish an independent 
Czechoslovakia in the post-war world.   
Throughout Bohemia’s long tenure within the Austrian Habsburg Empire, 
few people living in the Bohemian lands considered themselves distinctively 
“Czech” or had any conception of the boundaries of a Czech nation.  Even 
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during the last years of the Habsburg rule leading up to World War I, few 
intellectuals actively sought independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire; 
rather, most simply wanted autonomy and language rights under the current 
monarchy.   The outbreak of World War I shifted the status quo as these Czech 
nationalists, who had previously argued for Czech language rights, used the 
same justifications based on their distinct language and history in order to 
establish an independent state.  Consequently these intellectuals created a 
historicized myth of Czechoslovakia, utilizing historical arguments that had been 
created during the last century in order to establish a direct link between an 
emerging historic Czech nation to a distant Czech-Bohemian past.4  
These historical claims, however mythologized, helped establish and 
legitimize Czechoslovakia, and persist to the present as an integral part of 
Czech identity.  They are therefore essential to understanding the heated 
border disputes between Czechoslovakia and its neighbors following the end of 
the Great War. In addition, these historical claims, and resulting myths, are 
crucial to understanding why the idea of Czech historic rights meshed so well 
with Wilson’s principle of self-determination.  This mythology provided the 
impetus for demanding recognition of land which Czech nationalists claimed as 
“historic” and traditionally “Czech.”  
                                                           
4 See Andrea Orzoff, Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914-1948 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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The Czechs used the historic right argument in creating (or “recreating”) 
and legitimizing former Czechoslovakia from 1914 until 1939.  Central to   
understanding this use of history and language is an examination of why the 
Czechs used medieval history to legitimize their claims and why this argument 
was effective.  Also essential to understanding this process is the role of the 
Czech “nationalists,” and how the situation after World War I required their 
employment of historical “myth” in order to prove legitimacy and achieve 
independence.  These nationalists are not static and constantly change 
depending on the domestic and international situation.  
 Chapter Two explores the question of how Czech and Slovak immigrant 
groups impacted the relationship between the United States and what would 
become an independent Czechoslovakia.  Though historical myth provided the 
rhetoric, Czech and Slovak immigrant groups provided the muscle by lobbying 
the United States government to help their former homelands achieve 
independence.  These connections played no small part in helping endear 
Wilson to Masaryk and garner support for the independence cause.  These and 
other Czech-formed civil society associations continue, to the present day, to 
promote good relations between the Czech Republic and the United States.  
For example, the American Friends of the Czech Republic is the Czech 
immigrant group in the United States which commissioned and funded (mostly) 
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the 2011 Wilson statue in Prague.  Coupled with the close personal ties of the 
Czechoslovakian founding father to America, these immigrant groups played a 
significant role in the formation of an independent Czechoslovakia.      
 Finally, Chapter Three analyzes the Wilson Administration and World War I 
as it unfolds to answer the question of why Wilson chose to support the Czechs 
and Slovaks in their bid for independence.  What changed to make Wilson go 
from not wanting to break up the Austro-Hungarian Empire to supporting and 
speaking in support of an independent country of Czechoslovakia?  Part of this 
change in attitude had to do with Wilson’s ideas of what the world should look 
like; one component of his worldview was self-determination.  
Wilson’s policy of self-determination raised the hopes of the Czechs who, 
after the outbreak of World War I, began to lobby for independence of the 
historic lands of Bohemia and Moravia.  The reality of the situation, however, 
proved to be more complicated than Wilson’s immediate and blanket approval 
for Czech independence.  Over time, Wilson’s attitude toward the dissolution of 
Austria-Hungary and establishment of Czechoslovakia changed and adapted 
to events as they evolved during the course of the war and in the course of the 
Paris Peace Conference.  The problems with true self-determination became 
evident during the Těšín border dispute between Czechoslovakia and Poland as 
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well with the Sudeten German question, in which the Allied powers realized the 
complexities of the multinational East Central European region.5 
These three themes intertwine to create the myth of the creation of 
Czechoslovakia which can be seen in the Wilson statue in Prague.  Therefore, 
Chapter Four examines the meaning and intent behind the Wilson Statue as a 
site of memory, and what narrative of the past this monument represents.  If the 
Wilson statue, and other memory sites constructed in the 1920s, served to 
underscore the close relationship shared by the United States and 
Czechoslovakia and commemorate Czechoslovakian independence, they also 
legitimized the power of the new ruling elite.  Serving as a political tool to bind 
two nations together based on shared democratic values and historical 
circumstances, the monument also illustrates a specific place in time where 
historical events made the need to create the memory site a political 
imperative.  
 Consequently, the memory and legacy of Woodrow Wilson lives on 
today and can be seen through cooperation between the Czech Republic and 
the United States.  The Czechs truly haven’t forgotten about the role the United 
States played in the creation and independence of their country.  Moreover, 
United States citizens of Czech descent have not forgotten about their ancestral 
                                                           
5 Margaret Macmillan goes into detail in the Těšín border issue between Czechoslovakia and 
Poland in Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War 
(London: John Murray, 2001). 
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homeland.  The historic relationship between these two countries plays an 
important role in their foreign relations to this day.  Wilson’s principles of self-
determination continue to impact present political developments and persistent 
historical memory.  Thus, the statue of Wilson perpetuates the myth of the 
creation of Czechoslovakia and the myth of Wilson in the Czech Republic itself.  
It also presents the Czech Republic as a distinctly Western state by tying 
President Wilson and President Masaryk together as dual founding-fathers of 
Czechoslovakia.  This myth is reinforced by both the Czech government and 
immigrant groups in the United States in the creation and support of this site of 
memory, the Woodrow Wilson statue in Prague. 
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Chapter 1 
Legitimization of Historic Right in the Czech lands 
 
 In order to first understand the importance of Woodrow Wilson to the 
Czechs, it is crucial to understand Czech national rhetoric at the outbreak of 
World War I.  Then it is possible to understand how the Czechs’ political 
argument of historic right to lands and independence meshed with Wilson’s 
principle of self-determination.  As a result, Wilson as champion of Czech 
independence became integrated into the larger Czech national mythology.  
As will be evident in subsequent chapters, however, it took Wilson a long time to 
get on board with the idea of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and with Czech 
independence. 
 Alexei Miller argues in Historical Policy: Eastern Europe Convolutions in the 
21st Century, that historic policy, also known as “the broad use of history for 
political purposes,” is a twenty-first century phenomenon.  However, there is 
evidence of the Czechs using this exact type of historical discourse in order to 
achieve political goals, namely independence from the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire after the outbreak of World War I.  Miller states that it is difficult to 
“explain the sharp intensification in historical policy in the 2000s.”  Yet, it is quite 
simple when you look at the Czech nationalists, who under the Habsburgs 
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began to look to medieval history in order to first create a cultural and linguistic 
identity; and later a political-national identity in order to justify border claims to 
the Allied governments after using this policy to gain independence.6   
 Anthony Smith explains in his article “States and Homelands: the Social 
and Geopolitical Implications of National Territory,” that “to a nationalist, the 
national territory belongs to a nation by historic right, as a possession of his 
forefathers for many generations and a repository of sacred memories.”7   He 
further argues in National Identity that there are certain “fundamental features 
of national identity” and the first two he lists are “an historic territory, or 
homeland,” and “common myths and historical memories.”8  Consequently, 
these are the two main features of Czech national identity formation in the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries.   
In “Historical Rights: The Evaluation of Nationalists Claims to Sovereignty,” 
Chaim Gans distinguishes between two types of historic rights: chronologically 
based and value based.  Chronologically based historic right states that if an 
ethnic or religious group has a right to a land if they were the first to inhabit it.  
Value based historic right explains that a group has a right to particular land if it 
                                                           
6 Alexei Miller, “Historical Policy: Eastern European Convolutions in the 21st Century,” Russia in 
Global Affairs 4 (2011), accessed January 2, 2012, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/A-
Challenge-from-the-Past-15431. 
7 Anthony D. Smith, “States and Homelands: the Social and Geopolitical Implications of National 
Territory,” Millennium, Journal of International Studies 10, no. 3 (January 1981), 187-202. 
8 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 14. 
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is of “primary importance in forming the historical identity.”9  The Czech 
nationalists actually used both of Gans’ types of historic right in order to 
legitimize their land and independence claims.  They argued that Czechs first 
inhabited the historic lands of Bohemia and also that Czech identity was tied to 
that land.   
 
Why Medieval and Early Modern History? 
Though the different nationalities that made up the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire wished for greater autonomy within the empire, their desires 
only came to fruition with independence after World War I and only took place 
due to Woodrow Wilson’s principle of self-determination and western support.  
Thus Czech nationalists had to underscore a history in which their lands were not 
ruled by the Habsburgs in order to justify the right to exist as a state.  Therefore, 
looking back to medieval, and to some extent early modern, history became 
commonplace in Central and Eastern Europe, especially for the newly formed 
Czechoslovakia.  
Bohemia was the Habsburg Empire’s wealthiest kingdom due to the rich 
soil, strategic location, textile industry, mineral industry, and large population.  
                                                           
9 Chaim Gans, “The Evaluation of Nationalist Claims to Sovereignty,” Political Theory 29, no.1 
(February 2001), 58-60. 
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Therefore, the Habsburg Monarchy was content to let the Bohemians enjoy 
greater autonomy within the Empire.10  This autonomy was all but stripped away 
by Ferdinand II after the Battle of White Mountain in 1620 when he brought in 
foreign nobles to replace the rebellious Bohemian ones.  Therefore, Bohemian’s 
nobles were replaced by a group that was German, at least in language, and 
loyal to the Austrians.11  These nobles remained fiercely noble to the Austrian 
Empire after the Counter-Reformation, so they were then angered when, in 
1867, the Austrian Empire was reorganized into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-
Hungary.  In other words, Hungary gained equal status with Austria while 
Bohemia, now loyal in addition to being the most industrialized and richest part 
of the Empire, did not. 
  During the late Habsburg Empire, Czech nationals seeking an equal 
place for the Bohemian lands as Hungarians within the Empire had already 
begun the process of looking to the past for language and ethnic legitimacy 
within the Empire; therefore, it became easier to create a national identity for 
Czechs.  In fact, “some people from the region consider the Middle Ages to be 
the high point in their national historical traditions.”12  This historic Czech myth, 
                                                           
10 Charles W. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 10-12. 
11 Lonnie Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 85. 
12 Johnson, Central Europe, 26. 
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already having been created by nineteenth-century nationalists, became the 
foundation of legitimacy for the new Czech nation.   
Czechs also used medieval and early modern history in order to show how 
foreign subjugation had unlawfully stolen their statehood.  Events such as the 
murder of Jan Hus and the Battle of White Mountain were used to propagate 
the idea that Czechs had been treated unfairly and deserved the restoration of 
state independence on their historic lands.13  
Czech nationalists used three main foundational events or people in order 
to establish a national myth and link the present with the past.  While this is not 
an exhaustive list, these three show up the most when nationalists later utilized 
the medieval and early modern past: Jan Hus, Jan Žižka, and the Battle of White 
Mountain.  Jan Hus (1369-1415), a Bohemian priest, is considered a forerunner of 
the Protestant Reformation about one hundred years prior to Martin Luther. Hus 
                                                           
13 On Czech medieval history, see Lisa Wolverton, trans., Cosmas of Prague: The Chronicle of the 
Czechs (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009); Hugh LeCaine Agnew, 
The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2004); Hans 
Brisch and Ivan Volgyes, eds., Czechoslovakia: The Heritage of Ages Past (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1979); Johnson,  Central Europe; John M. Klassen, Warring Maidens, Captive 
Wives, and Hussite Queens: Women and Men at War and at Peace in Fifteenth Century Bohemia 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Josef Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia: The 
Meanings of Its History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Jaroslav Panek and Oldrich 
Tuma Et Alii,  A History of the Czech Lands (Prague: Charles University Press, 2009); Derek Sayer, 
The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Mikulas 
Teich, ed.,  Bohemia in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); C.V. Wedgwood, 
The Thirty Years War (New York: Methuen & Co., 1987); Lisa Wolverton, Hastening Toward Prague: 
Power and Society in the Medieval Czech Lands (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2001). 
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wanted to reform the Church and became popular within Bohemia as a result 
of his sermons in the Czech language, as opposed to Latin.  However, after 
being accused of heresy and summoned to the Council of Konstanz on the 
assurances of safety by Emperor Sigismund, he ended up burning at the stake 
which was later deemed a “national insult” to the Bohemian lands.14  Thus 
began the Hussite revolution as Hus’s followers began to resist Church and 
imperial power, eventually with arms. 
Jan Žižka(1360-1424), the one-eyed leader of the Hussite peasant armies, 
also became a national hero and mythological figure in the Czech national 
narrative.  This occurred mostly because he was able to lead peasants with 
simple weapons into battle against superior imperial armies and win multiple 
times.  In fact, he forced Emperor Sigismund’s army to withdraw from part of 
Bohemia and then defeated them.15   Thus, “heroic images of Czech unity 
against all were to be recalled in the nineteenth century as a source of national 
pride.”16   
Finally, the Battle of White Mountain (8 November 1620) became a symbol 
of national tragedy and subjugation for later Czechs.  Two years prior, the Thirty 
Years’ War began as a result of tensions between the Catholic Austrian Empire 
                                                           
14 Sayer, The Coasts of Bohemia, 37. 
15 Hugh Agnew, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 2004), 46. 
16 Sayer, The Coasts of Bohemia, 39. 
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and the Protestant Bohemian nobles that culminated in the defenestration of 
Prague.  Ferdinand II defeated the Bohemian nobles, who had rebelled against 
Ferdinand’s counter-reformation policies, and beheaded numerous nobles.  
Their heads were exhibited on the Charles Bridge for 10 years.  This resulted in the 
victory of the Catholic Counter-Reformation and the effective subjugation of 
the Bohemian nobility.  Ferdinand invited nobles who would be loyal to him to 
take over land in Bohemia; however, these new nobles came from all over 
Europe.    To complete this conquest, Ferdinand not only made German equal 
to Czech as an official language of Bohemia, but also placed education under 
Catholic Jesuit control.  Also, as a result of the human devastation of the Thirty 
Years’ War, the region suffered depopulation and as a result, Germans speaking 
workers began to migrate into the Bohemian lands from the German-speaking 
states of the Holy Roman Empire.   After 1620, the Kingdom of Bohemia which 
continued to exist within the Austrian Empire was the residue of the much larger 
Bohemian Kingdom established in the fourteenth century.17 
As historian Derek Sayer contends, “This modern nation is not so much 
rooted in that medieval experience as retrospectively reconstructed out of it.”18  
Thus, in order to understand the use of history and language during the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and beyond, it is imperative to understand the national 
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awakening led by Czech nationalists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
which constructed a national myth and identity from this history and coincided 
with the reemergence of the Czech language. 
National Awakening & Czech Nationalists 
The role of Czech language in establishing the Czechoslovak state cannot 
be understated.  Historians have thoroughly examined how the Czech 
language, revived during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, became a 
tool used by Czech nationals within the Austro-Hungarian Empire in order to 
establish linguistic rights.19  People living within Bohemia and Moravia prior to the 
twentieth-century, however, had much more flexible ideas about language, 
speaking both German and Czech depending upon the social or economic 
situation.  In addition, inhabitants of Bohemia were bilingual depending on 
vocation or social status. Therefore, Czech nationals had to establish a usable 
Czech language and expand its vocabulary since it had remained a peasant 
language despite not being used in the cities for so long. 
After the Battle of White Mountain, Habsburg rulers began a long practice 
of suppressing the local languages and elevating German in the government 
and education systems in Bohemia as a means to bring the richest area of their 
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empire under control.  Another goal in implementing this type of reform was to 
modernize and create a uniform language for administration throughout the 
Habsburg lands, and also to end repression throughout the Habsburg Empire.  
However, instead of simply creating an efficient administrative system, these 
reforms generated regional tensions as affected nobles began to rebel against 
what they saw as heavy-handed reforms to the status quo.  The new reforms 
specifically targeted non-German-speakers and put them at a disadvantage in 
what became a forced “Germanization” of the Bohemian lands.  Therefore, the 
Czech language became the focal point of dissent and the preservation of 
national identity became paramount.  The only problem was that Czech was a 
regional dialect spoken in the Bohemian and Moravian countryside as a result of 
these language laws.   
Maria Theresa and Joseph II, both Habsburg rulers, implemented 
enlightened reforms which, among other things, stipulated the use of one official 
language throughout the Empire, German which then turned the language 
issue into a political issue.20  However, they began to promote learning local 
languages, such as Czech, in schools.21  This wasn’t a problem for the Czechs 
because they had to learn German in school already as a result of the reforms 
made after the Battle of White Mountain.  Yet, Germans knew very little, if any, 
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Czech, which caused German-speaking “Ultra-Germans” to protest on behalf of 
German language rights thus exacerbating an already growing issue between 
the Czech-speaking nationalists and the German-speaking nationalists in the 
Bohemian crownlands.22  In response to the rhetoric of these “Ultra-Germans,” a 
new intellectual elite was born in the Bohemian lands which became known as 
the Czech national “awakeners” who began to “revive” Czech language as 
well as culture to counter the growing pressure of German language and 
culture in the Bohemian lands. 
National literature and the Czech language had to be revived in order to 
create some sort of national community.  Therefore, in the 1800s, Josef 
Dobrovsky, Josef Jungmann, Jan Kollar, Pavel Josef Safarik, and Frantisek 
Palacky all expanded the Czech vocabulary and integrated it into different 
types of national visions and rhetoric.  Ultimately, all these visions, goals, and 
developments led to the reemergence of a language which could compete 
with German in Bohemia by the late nineteenth-century.23  Masaryk later stated 
that by placing so much emphasis upon linguistic rebirth, [Czechs] became a 
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‘philological’ nation.”24  This culminated in the creation of Czech dictionaries, 
folk songs, cookbooks, almanacs, textbooks, etc.   
Eventually, these linguistic struggles took on a deliberately political 
dimension as Czech national “awakeners” began to compete with German-
speakers within the Bohemian lands for linguistic dominance.  Czech linguistic 
nationalism also became intertwined with historical arguments thus creating 
part of the eventual myth of Czechoslovakia.  Masaryk argued that as an 
“awakener,” Dobrovsky (1723-1829), a Czech scholar who is credited with the 
Czech national revival, came from the long tradition of the Czech reformation. 
This national awakening escalated in the 1860s with industrialization as 
Czech-speakers began to move from the countryside to cities for work which 
challenged the traditional “language borders” separating the German-
speaking city inhabitants and the Czech-speaking rural inhabitants.25  As this 
movement to the cities greatly increased the number of Czech-speakers in what 
had previously been predominantly German-speaking urban centers, the 
balance of power shifted and more Czech nationals began to participate in 
municipal politics.  Therefore, the use of history in Czech politics began with the 
revival of Czech language and culture. 
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Eventually, medieval history also came to be used and altered to fit the 
national narrative during the national awakening.  The Czech nationalists’ 
primary goal was to gain more autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
and establish a federalized state where Prague would have as much autonomy 
as Vienna and Budapest.  However, they had to establish legitimacy in the eyes 
of Austria in order to attempt to attain the same status as Hungary.  The 
widespread use of history in this region gained momentum under Habsburg rule 
when Czech nationalists were trying to establish more autonomy and construct 
a national identity.  Thus, nationalists constructed a Czech national identity 
around the Czech language and the medieval Bohemian past.  As Derek Sayer 
points out in The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History, “history itself, in the guise 
of a recovered memory, was to become a crucial ingredient in the very clear 
‘consciousness of national identity’ that did crystallize among Czechs in the later 
nineteenth century.”26   
What these intellectuals needed to accomplish was to create what 
Benedict Anderson called “an imagined political community” where its 
members could feel united even if they had never met.27  However, in 
Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the 
Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948, Tara Zahra contends that studies of nations 
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specifically as imagined communities “may have inadvertently exaggerated 
the universality and transparency of nationalist loyalties.”28  As many scholars 
have pointed out, national loyalty in the Bohemian lands proved to be a more 
complicated reality where people living in Bohemia spoke multiple languages 
and didn’t identify with a particular ethnicity.29   
Several historians focus on the emergence of Czech national identity in 
the nineteenth century; however, this was not the first time that Czechs had 
expressed their national identity.  In fact, Czech intellectuals, politicians, and 
nobles had argued for the preservation of their language within the Habsburg 
Empire after the Thirty Years’ War.30   Even earlier still, in the 12th century, Cosmas 
of Prague sought “to define the Czechs as a nation through history, compel 
them to think about their political culture, and urge reform, justice, and 
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responsibility.”31  His work became the foundation stone for the Czech historical 
myth which emerged during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.   
In addition to what the Czechs began to construct as their glorious history, 
events such as The Battle of White Mountain and the burning of Jan Hus at the 
stake became symbols for national tragedy, martyrdom and subjugation to a 
foreign power.  According to Lonnie Johnson, “The concept of nationalism had 
to be retrospectively articulated in terms of people’s ‘ancient’ freedoms, which 
had been violated” or “lost in the past” and “had to be regained or 
reestablished in the future,” even if it was easier to look back to a distinguished 
and idealized medieval history than the “intervening histories of foreign 
subjugation, regardless of how long they may have lasted.”32  Thus, Czech 
nationals who wanted either autonomy within or freedom from the Austro-
Hungarian Empire actively linked the past to the present.  For example, in a 
speech in 1910, Masaryk linked the Czech national revival of the eighteenth 
century to the Hussite reformation in order to provide a historical continuity basis 
for the current political struggle against the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  This 
historical narrative, however, did not leave room for any other victims of history 
within the Bohemian lands; it also created the necessary perpetrator or villain for 
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the nation to rally against, the Germans of Bohemia and Moravia. 
The power behind this cultural production of history by Masaryk and others 
gains credibility as it is based in facts.  The Habsburgs, specifically Ferdinand II, 
completely subordinated and then “Germanized” the nobility of the Kingdom of 
Bohemia during the Counter-Reformation in such a way as to render it 
incapable of resistance in the future.  The culminating battle in this conflict, the 
Battle of White Mountain, is arguably “a crucial concept in the raising of Czech 
national consciousness in the nineteenth century;” however, “it continued to 
have a nationalist connotation in Czech politics long into the twentieth 
century.”33  White Mountain can be viewed as the beginning of German 
oppression which culminated in the expulsion of Germans after World War II.  
Conversely, there was a history of coexistence that Czechs and Germans had 
before the rise of modern nationalism.  Germans were invited and welcomed 
into Bohemia to work prior to this time period and were seen as meaningful to 
society and culture.  Either way, Battle of White Mountain was a turning point in 
Czech-German relations, part of the myth of Czechoslovakia, which culminated 
in the eventual expulsion of Germans from Bohemian lands.   
 By the late nineteenth-century, Czech and German nationalists began to 
use language as a measure of nationality.  In the Bohemian lands, the only real 
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or tangible difference between Germans and Czechs was language.  Thus 
language became the battleground for nationality politics.  Czech and German 
nationalists alike were faced with a fundamental problem.  A vast majority of 
individuals living within the Bohemian lands remained indifferent to nationalism, 
nationalist appeals, and politics.  Attempts at “conversion” on the basis of 
language was largely met with indifference and disinterest from both German 
and Czech speakers.  Zahra argues that this indifference to nationalism was 
ultimately the driving force behind escalating nationalist tensions and battles 
over nationality.34  Moreover, families viewed bilingualism as a benefit and 
made sure their children knew both Czech and German.  Thus, the battle over 
these “hermaphrodites,” or bilingual children, ensued, each side trying to gain 
linguistic converts.35  While this was largely a Czech versus German problem, it 
created a political climate through its rhetoric which was toxic to anyone 
categorized as “other’ or outside the nationality.  It also propagated the idea of 
Bohemian lands specifically for Czech speakers which meant no more tolerance 
for bilingualism and plurality of ethnic groups.    
 The Czech nationalists also began to frame their argument for greater 
autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s existing framework on the basis 
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of historic right.  The principle of historical right “tried to prove that the Czech 
state had never ceased to exist legally;” thus, “constitutional 
independence…had never been legally interrupted.”36  It became an avenue 
through which Czech nationalists could attempt to reassert a number of 
constitutional rights of the previous Bohemian Kingdom.  Originally among the 
national awakeners, no vision of an independent state existed as these 
nationalists mainly wanted greater autonomy within the empire, much like that 
enjoyed by Hungary after 1862.  Nationalists began to call for a tri-monarchy 
together with Austria and Hungary on the basis of the historic right of the 
Bohemian crown.  In addition, the use of historic right of the Bohemian crown 
“did not correspond to ethnographic facts, but it was applicable as an effective 
political oversimplification.”37  Thus this principle sought to establish a political 
and territorial entity as opposed to a national one within the Bohemian lands 
which is important because then the economically rich and developed territory 
would not have to be divided into Czech and German parts. 
 Another concept which was developed during the national revival and 
progressively evolved during the nineteenth century was that of Czechs’ 
“democratic exceptionalism.”  Czech nationalists in the late nineteenth century 
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created this idea of Czech affinity for democracy which later played a role in 
legitimizing the Czechoslovak nation-state and acquiring its requested borders.  
One way in which history had a positive effect on future events is in democratic 
development.  As Lonnie Johnson argues in Central Europe, the “destruction of 
Bohemia’s feudal nation in the seventeenth century” after the Battle of White 
Mountain “contributed to the evolution of a more modern and democratic 
Czech political culture in the long run.”38  Recently, scholars of Czech history 
have been critical of the “democracy” of Czechoslovakia, calling it a failure 
and a farce.  However, Zahra argues that it is necessary to understand the 
Czech conception of democracy and not strictly measure it against an 
established Western model. 
Creation of National Identities & Minorities – Late Austrian Empire 
In the late nineteenth century the Habsburg Empire, under the strain of a 
large, inefficient bureaucracy, enacted reforms designed to create greater 
efficiency throughout the Empire.  Thus, the official language of the government 
became German which subsequently created a backlash in the Bohemian 
lands among the Czech nationalists who believed this to be an infringement on 
their historic right.  It also began the escalation of the Czech versus German 
conflict on the basis of language. Conversely, when Czech became a 
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language requirement in schools, German nationalists began accusing 
German-speaking officials of “forgetting their completely German origins” for 
not opposing this decision.39   
As discussed before, this led to competition over “amphibians” and a 
gradual radicalization of political positions when faced with an indifferent 
population.  However, some extremist, or “Germanomaniac,” German-speaking 
imperial authorities created a discourse which exacerbated the situation and 
caused some Czech nationalists to change their goal from autonomy within the 
Empire to independence from the Empire.  As a result of the language laws, the 
Austro-Hungarian administration ended a situation where being “German” 
meant a privileged place among the elites and a part of the government.  On 
the contrary, it created a space for non-German nationalists outside the 
government which hadn’t existed before.  Therefore, instead of creating a 
singular “German” state identity, the Austro-Hungarian Empire exacerbated 
existing divisions that helped to bring about its own demise.   
Even among Czechs, however, there did not emerge any sort of popular 
consensus on what it meant to be Czech or have a Czech identity, which 
explains the multitude of figures and symbols associated with the Bohemian 
lands.  One has to look no further than the myriad of monuments and festivals 
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which commemorate a variety of mythologized figures associated with different 
visions of national and religious identity.40   Therefore, even Czech identity was 
fluid and contested on a variety of different levels as well. 
Jews, another minority within the Bohemian lands, did not develop their 
own national identity within Bohemia in response to this categorization of 
“other.”  Instead they “assimilated into dominant national cultures.”41  
Frequently Jews became “Germanized” and took on a German national 
identity in addition to the language.42  One of the main reasons for this is due to 
the fact that the majority of Jews lived in the cities in the Bohemian lands which 
were, until the Industrial Revolution, predominantly German.  Unfortunately this 
led to resentment among Czech nationalists and a conflation of Jews with 
Germans which had disastrous effects later on.   
The outbreak of World War I completely changed the rhetoric of Czech 
nationalists as will be explored in the next two chapters.  The political elites, who 
were in exile, including the future president, Masaryk, made the decision to 
attempt to establish Czechoslovak independence.  However, he needed to 
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establish some sort of legitimacy for the new state’s right to exist.  Thus, he 
borrowed on nationalist ideas of historic right in order to present his vision of 
Czechoslovakia to the Allied powers.  In a speech in 1918, remarking on the 
significance of the Czechoslovak state, he contended:  
The Czechs will not be satisfied with the 
concession of national autonomy within an 
Austrian federation.  They have a historical right 
to the independence of the Czech lands 
(Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia); they insist on their 
right to the independence of the State created 
by them.  In addition to that, they have a 
historical and natural right to union with Slovakia, 
so brutally oppressed by the Magyars.43 
 
 Therefore, Masaryk applied the argument for historic right to Bohemia, 
Moravia, and Silesia.  He also includes Slovakia in this new state for strategic 
purposes.  However, since Slovakia and the Bohemian lands had much different 
historical pasts, this argument also had to be made on the basis of ethnic lines.  
Nonetheless, the argument for the inclusion of Slovakia manipulated history for 
political expedience.  As Edvard Beneš, Masaryk’s counterpart in exile in Paris 
argued:  
The term Czecho-Slovaks, or simply the Czechs, 
includes two branches of the same nation: 
Czechs and Slovaks” which “have the same 
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civilization, the same language and history.44   
 
Not only does this statement exemplify the manipulation of history, but it also 
shows a manipulation of ethnicity as he states that all Czechs and Slovaks should 
simply be called Czechs.   
Ironically, the Czech politicians argued against drawing any ethnic lines 
through the Bohemian lands on the rationale that the cities and districts were so 
ethnically intermixed that any territorial division of ethnicities would create a 
large Czech minority in German lands, which was unacceptable.  The Czechs, 
however, wished to retain the German, Polish, and Hungarian minorities within 
the new Czechoslovak state with certain minority rights guarantees such as 
schools in minority languages as well as representation in the new government.45   
There was also the hope that Czechs and Germans could live in peace after a 
decisive defeat of Germany in the war.  Even when these German parts of 
Czechoslovakia began to protest in order to remain a province of Austria, the 
Czechs refused to give in because “the principle of the integrity of the historic 
Bohemian-Moravian frontiers was not negotiable.”46   
However, the Czech nationalists made one mistake which cost them their 
independence to Nazi Germany in 1938-1939.  As Margaret Moore explains in 
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The Ethics of Nationalism, “appealing to historical links can legitimize claims to 
vast areas and many different irredentist claims.”47  Another problem with 
historical right which Moore discusses is that the adjudication of competing 
claims to a disputed territory depends “on where in history one starts, and whose 
history one accepts.”48  This is unfortunately a problem which is still contested 
today in numerous areas of the world where national groups or states claim a 
particular multiethnic territory.  This problem is incredibly difficult to solve when 
the argument of historic right was confronted by counter-claims of an ethnic 
majority, such as in the Czech case of the Sudetenland.  Unfortunately, this case 
ultimately ended in the forced expulsion of the Germans over contested 
historical rights after World War II which created a largely homogenous 
Czechoslovakia.  
Thus it is obvious that the argument of historic right played a large part in 
the Czech’s national awakening, but also in the quest for independence.  While 
this historic right argument is problematic, it still became part of the national 
myth of the Czech people and eventually the state of Czechoslovakia.  It also 
profoundly affected the immigrants in America who emigrated from Bohemia 
whether for economic or political reasons.  These immigrants who worked 
tirelessly for the independence of the Czechs and Slovaks are the subject of the 
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next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Influence of Immigrant Groups and Personal Connections 
  
In “What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia,” 
Herbert Adolphus Miller explains that before United States entry into the First 
World War, Americans were largely ignorant of Bohemia and the Czechs.  He 
further explains that there were only six books in English about Bohemia and the 
Czechs up to 1918.49  However, there existed large immigrant communities of 
Czechs and Slovaks all over the United States which, once united, caused the 
rest of America to take notice.  Yet the relationship between the United States 
and Czech people actually began in 1848.  The Revolution of 1848 not only 
“helped Americans discover East Central Europe,” but it also “prompted the first 
large Czech and eventual Slovak migrations to America.” 50 
An important factor of American support for Czecho-Slovak 
independence during World War I began after Tomáš Masaryk became a well 
known public figure.  In order to fully understand the legacy of Wilson and his 
impact on the memory of Czechs for the creation of Czechoslovakia, it is 
necessary to understand the work done by Tomáš Masaryk and Czech-
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American civil society groups to convince Wilson to support an independent 
Czechoslovak state.   
Tomáš Masaryk began his career as a professor of philosophy at the 
University of Prague.  His wife, Charlotte Garrigue, was born in Brooklyn and they 
were married in New York.  He even took her last name and became Tomáš 
Garrigue Masaryk.  Later, after visiting the United States again in 1907, he 
became convinced that “Czech-Americans were an important part of the 
Czech nation and that America could be a source of inspiration for Czech 
political life.”51  Masaryk was also influential and well known with Entente circles 
as an informant.52  Masaryk had worked previously in the Austrian Reichsrat 
(Parliament) as part of the Young Czech movement which was based on the 
belief that participating in the government would increase Czech 
representation as well as Czech political influence.   Later he served in the 
Reichsrat again as the founding member of the Realist Party.  As a result he was 
in the perfect position to supply the Entente powers and their allies with Austro-
Hungarian intelligence as well as provide useful propaganda which the Entente 
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used to garner support at home for the war.53 
Masaryk’s personal connections also proved immensely useful.  Masaryk 
was friends with wealthy American businessman Charles Crane who had 
important government connections, influence, and money, and valued him as 
an “admirable auxiliary for he knew nearly everybody whom Masaryk wanted to 
meet and was close to President Wilson.”54  Crane’s friendship proved even 
more profitable when, in 1915, Masaryk asked Crane for monetary assistance as 
the Czechs worked toward independence from Austria-Hungary.  After Czech 
independence his son, Richard Crane, became the first United States 
ambassador to the newly formed Czechoslovakia.  The connection between 
these two families doesn’t end there; in 1924, Masaryk’s son Jan Masaryk 
married Charles Crane’s daughter, Frances. 
Immigrant Influence on United States Policy 
The earliest Czech immigrants to America came after 1620; however, 
there were very few at first.  Most Czech immigrants settled in Chicago, New 
York, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Texas Pennsylvania, Iowa, Minnesota, 
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Nebraska Oregon, and California.55   They first formed sokols, gymnasiums, and 
began newspapers; however, when World War I broke out, more political 
groups emerged.  One of the unique advantages of a democracy is the ability 
of groups of people to come together for a common cause.  Often called civil 
society, these independent networks of voluntary associations or groups can 
simply hold meetings, or they can attempt to affect changes in policy or their 
government.  In Joseph Grady’s work, The Immigrants’ Influence on Wilson’s 
Peace Policies, he contends that part of President Wilson’s political philosophy 
was that “the people should rule” and thus he “welcomed pressure from the 
people.”56  Therefore, ambitious immigrant groups felt that it would be fruitful if 
they lobbied the U.S. president and government on behalf of their mother 
countries.   
According to Nancy G. Ford in Americans All!: Foreign Born Soldiers in 
World War I, “ethnic leaders saw their peoples’ participation in the fighting as a 
way of demonstrating loyalty to their adopted country and bringing liberation 
and independence to their homeland.”57  This was exactly the philosophy of the 
Czech and Slovak immigrants in forming these groups and working for their 
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homelands’ independence.  As Otakar Odlozilik points out, “the Czechs [in 
America] engaged in little political activity before 1914,” thus a majority of these 
political groups were formed as a response to the war and the prospect of 
Czecho-Slovak independence.58  United States entry into the war caused these 
immigrants to join the United States military and fight against who they viewed 
as Bohemia’s true oppressors, the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  To a large extent, 
this proved to be a useful venture and helped bring about Czech 
Independence.  However, volunteering to serve in the United States army was 
not the most important factor but part of a larger phenomenon of émigré 
political influence on emerging Czech-American relations.  It’s also worth 
mentioning that a majority of the immigrants who joined the United States 
military did so in order to prove their loyalty to their new country and its allies 
since technically they were fighting against the state from which they came, the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire.59   
 These Czech civil society groups in America adopted the expressed goal 
of bringing about Czech independence after the outbreak of World War I.60  
When the war broke out these groups formed to offer support to their fellow 
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Slavs, the Serbs, or to provide relief in the form of contributions to the Serbian 
Red Cross.  There also emerged a number of Slovak groups which had the same 
purposes as the Czech.  The first large Czech group which called for 
independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire formed the Bohemian 
National Alliance in Cleveland in March 1915; however, its headquarters were 
located in Chicago.  These two cities had the largest concentration of Czechs in 
America, so it made sense that this is where the movement began.   
The Czech and Slovak immigrant groups began to work together for the 
larger goal of independence of Slavic nations in Austro-Hungarian held 
territories.  The Cleveland Pact, between the Slovak League of America and the 
Bohemian National Alliance, in October 1915 stated the goal of these two 
groups were for Czecho-Slovak independence.61  Other groups existed which 
also promoted Czech and/or Slovak interests in America such as the National 
Alliance of Catholic Czechs, the Czech National Federation, the First Slovak 
Evangelical League, the National Alliance of Bohemian Catholics,  to name a 
few.   
These groups also created organizations such as the Czech-Slav Press 
Bureau with the expressed goal of garnering support for Czecho-Slovak 
independence as well as putting out propaganda about the evils of the Austro-
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Hungarian Empire, and the Czechoslovak Relief Council which later became 
known as the Czechoslovak Red Cross. There were also newspapers such as the 
Bohemian Review, which kept Czechs and Slovaks informed of critical events of 
the war as well as independence efforts in America and abroad.  In addition, 
Czech groups in other countries became active in the independence 
movement as well.62  It is important to mention that Czech and Slovak émigré 
and exile communities in London and Paris also proved influential in lobbying 
Western governments for Czecho-Slovak independence.63  
Perhaps the most influential of all the Czech-American émigré groups was 
the Czechoslovak National Council of America (CNCA), formed in 1917.  It 
consisted of three groups, the Bohemian National Alliance, the Slovak League of 
America, and the Czech Catholics.  The CNCA lobbied Washington for Czech 
and Slovak independence.  Czech- and Slovak-Americans even donated 
money to the Czecho-Slovak independence cause. 
What raised the status of the CNCA was the establishment of invaluable 
contacts with Senator William S. Kenyon of Iowa, Representative Adolph J. 
Sabath of Chicago, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, diplomat and presidential 
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advisor Colonel Edward House, and State Department chief of the Near Eastern 
Division Dr. Albert Putney.  When Masaryk arrived in the United States in 1918, he 
benefited greatly from all the networking already done in this area by the 
CNCA.  The CNCA lobbied these important people on behalf of an 
independent Czecho-Slovak state and, while it is unclear how much these 
contacts helped in the independence effort, it is clear that they helped United 
States decision-makers become aware of and familiar with the issue at hand.  
Masaryk and Independence 
 In May of 1918, Masaryk travelled to Chicago in order to get American 
support, and Charles Pergler was appointed from the Bohemian Alliance to 
become Masaryk’s secretary.  Pergler wrote about this time later in his book 
America in the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence. One of the most 
influential meetings of the CNCA began that same month when Masaryk met 
with its members and together they drafted the Pittsburgh Agreement.  This 
document became the basis for Czecho-Slovak independence and the 
Czecho-Slovak Declaration of Independence which occurred later in October.   
 Finally on June 19th, 1918, Masaryk met with Wilson.  Much of the 
conversation centered on whether or not the Czech Legion in Siberia could be 
used against the Russian Bolsheviks.  Thus, another important factor in the 
Western support of the Czechoslovak position was the role of the Czech military 
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forces.  Czech forces, unlike those of other Austrian Empire nationalities, were 
militarily effective and well organized so that the “bargaining position of the 
Czechs was improved by their military contribution to the Allies.”64 Other Slavic 
soldiers in the armies of the Central Powers refused to fight the Czechs and 
would actually desert their regiments when faced with Czech soldiers; therefore, 
the Allies began to use the Czechs toward the end of the war.  However, the 
key influential factor proved to be the Czech Legions, which had been awaiting 
evacuation from Siberia but remained available in case of the necessity of 
Allied intervention in the Russian civil war.  In addition, they carried out missions 
for the Allies such as holding the Trans-Siberian Railway.  Beneš viewed the 
Legions in Siberia as “an asset which could be used to secure definite 
recognition of Czechoslovak political and territorial aspirations.”65  Therefore, the 
potential use of Czech military forces proved invaluable in attaining Allied 
political support for a Czechoslovak state.66   
Interestingly, this army recognized the Czecho-Slovak CNCA in the United 
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States as its political and military authority when acting in the region.67  However, 
Masaryk was opposed to the idea of using the Czech Legions against the 
Bolsheviks and encouraged Wilson and Lansing to utilize Japanese intervention 
instead.  Masaryk did not know what Wilson hoped to accomplish with only 
50,000 or 100,000 troops.68  Yet, these troops succeeded in controlling parts of 
the Trans-Siberian Railway.  While Masaryk preferred a Japanese option, Wilson 
still favored using the Czech troops.69 
The United States government believed that the announcement of 
support for the Czechs in May of 1918 would encourage the Czechs in America 
to support the United States in World War I.70  However, the Czechs already 
actively supported the Allied war effort, mostly as a means to end imperial rule 
of their homeland.  As a result of all of these activities, on October 18th, 1918, 
Masaryk released the Declaration of Czechoslovak independence and one 
month later he was elected the first President of Czechoslovakia.  Ironically, 
Masaryk became President of Czechoslovakia while still in Washington D.C.  The 
Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence, written in the United States in 
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English, even had Woodrow Wilson’s name in it. 
We accept the democratic principles of America 
and France; we accept the American principles 
as laid down by President Wilson: the principles of 
liberated mankind – of the actual equality of 
nations – and of governments deriving all their 
just powers from the consent of the governed.71 
 
Aviel Roshwald states that Masaryk is “the most striking example of how 
war-time exiles in the Allied countries could propel a hitherto respected but 
relatively powerless figure into the seat of power.”72  Masaryk was a well known 
educator, intellectual, and politician in Bohemia before the war; however, no 
one would have thought at the time he would be the first president or leader of 
an independent Czechoslovakia.  His work with the Allied leaders, especially 
Wilson, and with immigrant and émigré groups in the West, especially those in 
the United States, gained him the political fame which awarded him this 
distinguished position. 
 In the national myth of the creation of Czechoslovakia, Masaryk is given 
credit for “converting Wilson to an anti-Austrian policy.”73  Masaryk himself later 
contended that he and Czechs abroad were responsible for Wilson’s support of 
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Czech independence.  
Thus I was able, step by step, to persuade the 
President and Mr. Lansing to accept [Czech 
independence].  But this was by no means the 
result of my personal influence alone.  The work 
and propaganda of our people won us public 
goodwill – and Austria-Hungary lost it.74 
 
It is important to note, as several historians have pointed out, Masaryk didn’t 
singlehandedly persuade Wilson to accept Czechoslovak independence.  There 
were other factors such as the Czech Legion in Siberia, which will be discussed in 
Chapter Three.  However, this became part of the national myth and political 
discourse on Czech independence.  Thus, this idea of Wilson as defender of the 
Czechs is also based on the myth that he was won over to their worthy cause by 
Masaryk, which became the basis for the idea of Masaryk and Wilson as twin 
champions of Czech independence.   
 This view of Masaryk and Wilson as co-champions of Czech 
independence was accepted by the United States government as well.  This is 
evident when looking at the1968 document, Background Materials Designed for 
Use in the Preparation of Statements and Speeches Commemorating 
Czechoslovak Independence Day (October 23rd) and the Birthday of Czech 
President Tomáš Masaryk (March 7), found in the Library of Congress: 
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In the summer of 1918, Masaryk conferred with 
President Wilson and effectively laid the 
groundwork for full American support for the 
Czechoslovak cause of national independence.  
On July 8, Beneš sent a letter to Prague in which 
he elaborated on the extent of American 
support.  ‘Masaryk is in America,’ he wrote.  ‘He 
has spoken several times with Wilson, and informs 
me that our cause has been won so completely 
that Wilson and the American government have 
promised not to make any fundamental 
decisions on Austro-Hungarian affairs without us 
or without our approval.75 
 
Therefore, it is evident that this myth of Wilson and Masaryk is actually 
proliferated by both the Czech and American governments beyond simply the 
creation of Czechoslovakia.    
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Chapter 3 
Self-Determination: Wilson’s Policies Toward the Czechs During and After World 
War I 
 
 It is important to understand that the principle of self-determination was 
one part of Wilson’s broader foreign policy worldview.  According to Gordon 
Levin in Woodrow Wilson and World Politics,” Wilson’s goal was to “create an 
international civil society” by “Americanizing” the rest of the world thus “creating 
a world society under law, to be preserved through the moral and material 
strength of the international social contract embodied in the League of 
Nations.”76  Therefore, Wilson wanted to create a democratic, peaceful, stable 
world.  He believed that in order to create this new stable democratic world, 
there must be a free flow of ideas and commerce across national boundaries.  
These ideas culminated in the League of Nations in which Wilson as the 
“fulfillment of his long effort to use America’s moral and material power to move 
the world from a warlike state of nature to an orderly global society governed 
by liberal norms.”77  The final piece to Wilson’s worldview was self-determination. 
In elaborating the principle of self-determination of nations Woodrow 
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Wilson stated, “Every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which 
they shall live.”78  Wilson came from an International Relations school of thought 
which today is called idealism and is known for looking at the world the way it 
ought to be according to Western liberal ideas as well as emphasizing 
cooperation among like-minded nations.  While his contemporaries were 
skeptical of Wilson, the application of his idealism to foreign policy today has 
caused some scholars and practitioners to claim that he was ahead of his time.  
Henry Kissinger even stated, “Wilsonianism has survived while history has 
bypassed the reservation of his contemporaries.”79  
Ben Rosamond states that the idealist emphasizes the “perfectibility of 
humanity and the virtues of collective security, postnational systems for peace 
and the advocacy of international organisations.”80  As an idealist, Wilson’s 
principle of self-determination conforms to contemporary liberal internationalism 
theory which focuses on morality and cooperation in international politics.  One 
could even argue that the Velvet Divorce of Czechoslovakia into the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia was a direct result of the legacy of Woodrow Wilson and 
his policies of self-determination.  However, this is a topic for another work.   
Nevertheless, it is from this school of thought that we can understand Wilson’s 
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moral, idealistic vision of American foreign relations as it took shape during World 
War I.  
 Wilson’s ideas didn’t occur spontaneously and independently.  As Betty 
Miller Unterberger explains, we must understand self-determination in the 
American context as it developed over time.81  Therefore it is imperative to 
briefly examine self-determination as expressed in the United States experience.  
The colonies in North America began as an expression of self-determination.  
Europeans who wanted to get away from oppressive rulers came to American 
shores in order to have the right to “determine their own political destiny.”82  The 
American Revolution occurred as a continuation of this belief in the right of a 
people to govern themselves.  Essentially, America was founded on the 
principle of self-determination, although it wasn’t called that explicitly at the 
time.  Thomas Jefferson stated it best when he said, “We surely cannot deny to 
any nation that right whereon our own government is founded, that everyone 
may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases and change those 
forms at its own will.”83   
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 The idea of self-determination in America changed as the United States 
government began to get involved in more foreign entanglements.  Therefore, 
President Millard Fillmore proclaimed that if America truly believed in self-
determination, it should stay out of other nation’s affairs.  The American Civil War 
further cemented the government’s non-interventionist policies as the Union 
rejected any foreign intervention in the conflict; however, as the Confederacy 
claimed the principle of self-determination in its rebellion it became a 
problematic stance.  Self-determination of nations became an idea that 
America expressed, but not as a foreign policy goal that would cause the 
government to act.84 
 
Wilson and Czecho-Slovak Self-Determination 
Wilson didn’t feel that the tenets of self-determination expressed in the 
Declaration of Independence were “merely a statement of political ideals but 
also a program for action.”  Wilson believed that self-determination “meant 
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government by consent of the governed – a moral necessity.”85  Yet, Wilson 
didn’t define the concept or its application; he also came to realize the 
complications in applying this idea to foreign policy during the postwar peace 
conferences.  Even for contemporaries, Wilson’s idea of self determination 
proved difficult to define: “When the President talks about ‘self-determination’, 
what has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community?  
Without a definite unit which is practical, application of this principle is 
dangerous to peace and stability.”86   
Allen Lynch also argues that Wilson didn’t have much knowledge of East 
Central Europe when he made speeches about self-determination and 
positioned it among his Fourteen Points, which he came to realize at the Paris 
Peace Conference.87  Later, Wilson had to make good on certain promises that 
otherwise wouldn’t have been made if not for the war.  First, however, he had to 
come to the decision to dissolve Austria-Hungary, a decision that didn’t occur 
as early or have as much support as Czech nationalists previously believed. 
 It is well documented that Wilson did not want to dissolve the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, and he worked secretly with the Habsburgs in order to try to 
bring them to the peace table in order to isolate Germany.  Despite the work of 
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the immigrant groups in the United States as well as Masaryk, Wilson wasn’t 
ready to commit to the dissolution of Austria-Hungary.  Only when these secret 
talks fell through in the fall of 1918 did Wilson begin to seriously consider openly 
supporting the Czechs and Slovaks in their independence aims.   
Although Wilson still wasn’t set on Austro-Hungarian dissolution, as soon as 
he stated “that every people has the right to choose the sovereignty under 
which they shall live,” he became the unwitting champion of the Czechs and 
Slovaks who argued for independence.88  On January 10th, 1917, the Allied 
powers stated their war goals, which included “the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, 
of Roumanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination.”89  Yet, the 
Americans, not yet a belligerent, still hoped for peace with Austria-Hungary in 
order to isolate Germany and end the war.  
In Wilson’s June 14th 1917, Flag Day Address, he recognized the Czechs in 
Bohemia as a people who didn’t want to be part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and wish to “direct their own affairs” and will only be satisfied by 
“undisputed independence.”90  Even here, he didn’t acknowledge the Austro-
Hungarian Empire as the oppressors of the Bohemians, but rather Germany 
which used Austria-Hungary and all its minority groups to its advantage in the 
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war.  In December of 1917, when asking for a declaration of war from Congress, 
Wilson stated: 
[W]e do not wish in any way to impair or to 
rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  It is no 
affair of ours what they do with their own life, 
either industrially or politically.  We do not 
purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way.  
We only desire to see that their affairs are left in 
their own hands, in all matters, great or small.91 
 
Immigrant groups responded by lobbying their liaisons in the government, 
stepping up their propaganda efforts, as well as volunteering for the United 
States Military.  Even if they weren’t able to join as a result of immigrant status, 
many joined the Czechoslovak Army on the Western Front.92   
On January 8th, 1918, Wilson delivered to Congress the famous Fourteen 
Points Speech of which Point Ten became the beacon of hope for Czechs and 
Slovaks living within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and abroad.  Point Ten stated 
that “The peoples of Austria-Hungary whose place we wish to see safeguarded 
and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous 
development.”93  Yet as both Allen Lynch and Betty Miller Unterberger have 
pointed out, this was not actually applying the principle of self-determination to 
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the ethnic groups in the empire.  Instead it is calling for greater autonomy in a 
true federation of Austria-Hungary.94  Even so, Wilson became overwhelmed by 
the sheer number of ethnic groups which expressed their wishes for self-
government as a result of his declarations on self-determination.  He stated: 
When I gave utterance to those words, I said 
them without a knowledge that nationalities 
existed, which are coming to us day after day…. 
You do not know and cannot appreciate the 
anxieties that I have experienced as the result of 
many millions of people having their hopes raised 
by what I have said.95 
 
On May 29th, 1918, Robert Lansing announced that the “nationalistic 
aspirations of the Czechoslovaks and Jugo-Slavs for freedom have the earnest 
sympathy of [the United States] government.”96  In the fall of 1918, Wilson finally 
conceded to dismantling the already disintegrating Austria-Hungary and 
referred to the empire as “an old building whose sides has been held together 
by props.”97  This had more to do with the fact that ethnic groups all over the 
empire began to call for independence and there was nothing the Habsburgs 
could do about it at that point.  Finally, on October 19th, 1918, President Wilson 
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officially declared his support for a Czechoslovak state to Vienna and eventually 
stipulated Czech independence as a precondition to the armistice of 1918.  
Secretary Lansing expressed Wilson’s support in these terms in a letter to the 
Swedish Foreign Minister:  
Since [point ten of the fourteen points] was 
written and uttered to the Congress of the United 
States… the President is no longer at liberty to 
accept the mere ‘autonomy’ of these peoples 
as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that 
they, and not he, shall be the judges of what 
action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government will satisfy their aspirations and their 
conception of their rights and destiny as 
members of the family of nations.98 
 
Even as these events unfolded, Wilson didn’t know a great deal about the 
actual situation in East Central Europe.  As Allen Lynch explains, Wilson began to 
realize the “complexities of actually implementing the idea of national self-
determination in East-Central Europe” which caused him to “express significant 
reservations about the concept himself.”99  He even stated,  
When I gave utterance to those words [that all nations 
had a right to self-determination], I said them without a 
knowledge that nationalities existed, which are coming 
to us day after day… You do not know and cannot 
appreciate the anxieties that I have experienced as 
the result of many millions of people having their hopes 
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raised by what I have said.100 
 
As a result, when the Paris Peace Conference began, Wilson and the Americans 
began to withdraw from actual decision-making with regards to issues of self-
determination, and a new champion, France, stepped up its support for a 
Czechoslovak state.  Yet Czechoslovakia still based a majority of its territorial 
arguments on Wilson’s principle of self-determination and, as a result, the idea of 
Wilson as its champion lives on. 
 As a result of Czechoslovak independence, the Czechs and Slovaks 
believed that Wilson was their liberator.101 Yet, President Wilson told Charles 
Pergler: “By your conduct throughout the war, especially by your armies, you 
have demonstrated that you insist upon complete independence.  WE have 
merely recognized an accomplished fact.”102  Wilson thus gave the immigrant 
groups credit for Czech independence as a result of their efforts to make 
contacts in Congress and organize speeches an sway American public opinion 
on the matter of Czecho-Slovak independence.  However, independence 
wasn’t the only goal of the Czech diplomats; next they had to secure the 
borders of the new state, which proved equally as difficult as gaining American 
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support for independence.    
 
Border Disputes and Minorities Within Czechoslovakia 
As the Austro-Hungarian Empire broke up at the conclusion of World War I, 
several states emerged in Eastern Europe along ethnic lines, basing their claims 
on President Woodrow Wilson’s policy of self-determination.  However, ethnic 
boundaries were not clear from the start and, as a result, border disputes over 
former Austro-Hungarian territory emerged.  In the 1921 Czechoslovak census, 
which used mother tongue as a basis for determining nationality, 
Czechoslovakia contained a combined ethnic minority population of 34.49% of 
the total population.103  A large portion of these minorities, with the exception of 
ethnic Germans, lived in contested areas of Silesia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia.  In 
Czechoslovakia, the Czechs and Slovaks only made up about 65 percent of the 
country’s total population; therefore, it became more effective to use historical 
and linguistic arguments to establish borders as opposed to demographic 
ones.104 
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After World War I, the new Czechoslovak state began again to use 
historical arguments to justify border claims.  However, while the border regions 
they claimed had, in fact, historically been a part of the Bohemian crownlands, 
they had since been settled by non-Czechs.  Like Czechoslovakia, “many of the 
‘new’ states in the region wanted their ‘old’ borders to be reestablished, and 
this objective became a source of conflict among neighbors, because the 
historical borders either had been fluid throughout the ages or did not 
correspond to national borders in the ethnic sense of the word.”105 
Predominantly German-speaking provinces such as Sudetenland, 
Deutsch-Böhmen, and Deutsch-Sudmähren became part of the new 
Czechoslovak state in order to “unite them with the rest of the country and 
strengthen Czechoslovak territorial claims at the Paris Peace Conference.”106  It 
was also argued that the only reason why Germans made up significant 
minorities in these provinces was a result of Bohemian nobles’ invitation to 
German colonists to work, or German migration to “traditional” Bohemian lands 
as a result of White Mountain.  Thus, history was put to work again in legitimizing 
and justifying border claims and disputes.  
Though the Western allies had no clear policy when it came to border 
disputes, some had specific agendas.  France, for example, saw a strong 
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Czechoslovak state as a future ally against a common enemy, Germany.  
Therefore, the French set out to secure strategically and economically favorable 
frontiers for the Czechoslovak state; however, they also wanted a giant buffer 
zone, and even a confederation of states made up of Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, and Poland.  While the United States made sure Czechoslovakia 
gained independence; they didn’t have much to do with the actual decisions 
on the settlement of borders. The British preferred to remain largely out of the 
decision-making on East-Central European borders as they were preoccupied 
elsewhere.  Thus, the Czechs were free to seize territory which they considered 
theirs by historic right as the “territorial limits of the states were determined 
piecemeal by the Big Four, who never fitted the fragments together or 
considered the influence of their decisions on the political and economic 
balance of the area.”107   
In order to incorporate Slovakia and Ruthenia, Masaryk and Beneš turned 
to Wilson’s principle of self-determination.  Masaryk argued that the Slovaks and 
Ruthenes wanted to be free of Hungary and be part of the democratic 
federation of Czechoslovakia.  Ironically, France proved to be the real ally of 
Czechoslovakia at Paris, not the United States, and as a result Czechoslovakia 
achieved nearly all of its territorial demands.   
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At the Paris Peace Conference, Beneš argued for Czechoslovak borders 
in the north to be based on historical right and economics.  In the case of Těšín 
(Teschen in German, or Cieszyn in Polish), the Czechs wanted to control the 
economically prosperous coal region of Austrian Silesia, which also happened to 
correspond to the historic medieval borders of Bohemia-Moravia.  Additionally, 
Czechoslovakia claimed that the only railway to connect the western part of 
the newly formed country with Slovakia was located in the Těšín region.  
Unfortunately, this conflict also led to a break-down in relations as well as 
hostilities between Poland and Czechoslovakia, particularly over their shared 
border. Both states had a legitimate argument for the possession of Těšín.  
Poland argued that this city had a Polish majority (around 55%), and 
Czechoslovakia argued for its strategic importance to the new country as well 
as that it had historically belonged to the Bohemian crownlands.  Linguistically, 
when this area of Silesia was under Habsburg rule, “German served in most 
capacities as the administrative language; there were no fixed or obvious 
borders of Polish and Czech language and culture in Těšín Silesia.”108   
Těšín was also valuable to both countries’ economies due to the presence 
of a large urban industrial center surrounded by coalfields as well as a strategic 
railway point.  Therefore, on January 23rd, 1919, after much dispute about the 
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status of the region, Czech troops invaded the Polish portion of Těšín and 
captured the city.  This resulted in an armed confrontation until February 5th, 
1919.  Despite Allied involvement, it was still determined that Czechoslovakia 
and Poland should solve the dispute themselves; however, neither side was 
willing to give up their claim to the entire region.  Eventually, despite attempts at 
a plebiscite, the Council of Ambassadors, part of the League of Nations for 
treaty compliance, decided the border which was signed into effect the Spa 
Conference in Belgium in July 1920.   
In 1920, the League of Nations determined that the city to the north 
belonged to Poland and the coalfields and railway lines to the south belonged 
to Czechoslovakia.  However, neither side was happy with this resolution since 
each lost part of Těšín and both sides claimed the entire region.  Sir James Roy, 
a British diplomat sent to ensure the peaceful transfer of the city of Těšín to 
Poland in 1920, explained that “as to the possibility of rapprochement between 
Czech and Pole, this is for the moment impracticable.  Both are incapable of 
thinking in terms other than local; their vision is circumscribed by urgent 
problems of social reconstruction and irritating questions of boundary 
delimitation.”109 
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Ultimately, Czechoslovakia obtained almost all border claims, including the 
majority of the province of Těšín.  One way to understand this decision is that 
Masaryk and Beneš appealed to the democratic principles that had supposedly 
guided the Allies in World War I.  Their argument of democratic exceptionalism 
and national self-determination on the basis of “historic rights,” coupled with the 
Czech émigré communities lobbying key members of the Allied governments 
and the League of Nations, resulted not only in the granting of statehood, but 
border claims as well.  It also helped that the personalities and rhetoric of the 
Czech politicians appealed to the Allies.  In Peacemakers: The Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War, Margaret Macmillan explains 
the effectiveness of Czech claims to democratic exceptionalism in the eyes of 
Entente diplomats: 
The Poles were, of course, dashing and brave but 
quite unreasonable, the Romanians charming and 
clever, but sadly devious, the Yugoslavs, well, rather 
Balkan.  The Czechs were refreshingly Western… 
Beneš and Masaryk were unfailingly cooperative, 
reasonable and persuasive as they stressed the 
Czech’s deep-seated democratic traditions and their 
aversion to militarism, oligarchy, high finance, indeed 
all that the old Germany and Austria-Hungary had 
stood for.110   
 
Beneš worked diligently attempting to win over the Allies in Paris.  His effort was 
rewarded when he sat on the Supreme War Council when no other 
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representatives of Central or Eastern European states were invited.  In the long 
run, the main problem with the borders which he secured proved to be the 
large ethnic minorities which now resided within the Czechoslovak state.   
 Ultimately, almost every Czechoslovak border claim was granted; 
however, this proved to be a mixed blessing.  Gaining the historic Bohemian 
lands meant that Czechoslovakia would also gain large and diverse minority 
populations which proved to be problematic later.  The ethnic minority situation 
didn’t change much from Austrian administration to Czechoslovak, except that 
now the Czech nationalists were in a position to enact laws which furthered their 
Czech-centered goals.  Once again, there didn’t seem to be any room for 
autonomy of national minorities, even though Czechs and Slovaks knowingly 
pursued borders which would create a multi-ethnic state.  However, as Tony 
Smith explains, during the inter-war period, the multi-ethnic character actually 
helped contributed to Czechoslovakia’s successful maintenance of a 
democracy.  The sheer fact that the Czechs and Slovaks always had to 
compromise with each other made it difficult for a single national group to gain 
hegemony which helped the plurality of Czechoslovak democracy.111 
 Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia, consciously intended for 
Czechoslovakia to be a multi-ethnic state.  However, once again the promotion 
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of Czech interests above all others as a legacy of the Czech-German conflicts 
during the late Habsburg Empire encouraged the exclusion of any other 
identities aside from that created by Czech nationalists.   For example, Slovaks 
were encouraged to be proud of their heritage; however, it was their invented 
“Czech” heritage that was intended.   
 Increasingly, the Czech government turned to legal means now that they 
were available in order to nationalize its citizens and begin the process of 
“Czechification.”112  The government sanctioned the migration of Czechs into 
predominantly German areas in order to gain a more legitimate foothold in 
these German-speaking regions of the new Czechoslovak state.  Interestingly 
enough, although Germans were recognized as non-Czech, they could still 
become Czech just by speaking the language.  Thus existed continuity from the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire between these two created identities for a sizeable 
portion of the population.  The situation for Jews didn’t change as a result of the 
change in regime.  Their association with, and frequent assimilation into German 
culture caused Czech nationalists to criticize them and view them as “agents of 
Germanization in nationally contested regions.”113  
After World War I, comprised of Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia, 
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Ruthenia and the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia controlled a pivotal central 
location in Europe.  Bohemia not only provided the unity necessary to keep 
these parts of Czechoslovakia together but seemingly protected the integrity of 
Europe as well.  Recognizing Bohemia’s geopolitical significance in the late 
nineteenth century, Bismarck declared “whoever is the master of Bohemia is the 
master of Europe,” adding that “the boundaries of Bohemia are the safeguard 
of European security.”  In his mind “the Czech nation does not lust for 
domination” therefore their continued presence in Bohemia protected Europe 
from plunging into chaos.  Conversely he asserted that any adventurers who 
attempted to violate the sovereignty of Bohemia would “plunge Europe into 
misery.”114  
 Bismarck’s statement reigned true in 1938, when the Czechs lost control of 
the Sudetenland to Hitler as a result of the Munich Agreement, which paved the 
way for the subsequent Nazi takeover of all of Bohemia.  Consequently, all of 
Europe was plunged into chaos.  However, where was this special relationship 
between the Czechs and Americans now?  The United States government 
explained the situation as follows: 
Because of its geographic isolation deep in 
Central Europe and the emergence of a 
powerful Nazi Germany and Communist Russia 
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on its borders, Czechoslovakia was never to have 
Western support sufficiently strong to guarantee 
its national independence and territorial integrity.  
Essentially the Czechoslovaks have been left to 
fend for themselves in one of the most politically 
sensitive areas of Europe.115 
 
 Though Otakar Odlozilik is quick to point out that Wilson took much longer 
to support the Czecho-Slovak independence aims than other Allied powers, in 
fact didn’t matter or register with the Czechs.  It also didn’t matter that Wilson 
didn’t actively support Czech border claims in Paris.  When Masaryk finally 
returned to a newly formed Czechoslovakia as its president he returned to 
fanfare and a belief that President Wilson and the United States would always 
be the Czechs’ guarantor of independence.  Thus began a time period where 
portraits of Wilson “were to be seen not only in public buildings along with those 
of Masaryk but also in private homes – evidence of the belief that President 
Wilson was the best friend of Czechoslovakia, the chief promoter among the 
Allies of its interests and aims.”116 
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Chapter 4 
Case Study: Wilson in Czech Memory and Monumental Politics 
 
In 1923, Masaryk sent the dying Wilson two photo albums with pictures of 
all the public places that the Czech people had named for him, such as streets 
and squares.  There were postcards commissioned in his honor as well with 
images of both Masaryk and Wilson on them (see appendix).  When Wilson 
passed away in 1924, the Czechoslovaks held services in his honor in Prague and 
Beneš gave a speech about the importance of Wilson to the Czechoslovak 
state.117  The biggest honor came in the form of a statue in Prague opposite the 
Wilson Railway Station in 1928.  What was the meaning and intent behind this 
site of memory, and what narrative of the past does this monument represent?  
With the vast expansion of the field of memory studies, it is important to be clear 
about what one is discussing.   
Theory – What Type of Memory? 
 The type of memory addressed here is collective and takes the form of 
political or national memory.  Jeffrey Olick explains that “memories… are as 
much the products of the symbols and narratives available publicly - and of the 
social means of storing and transmitting them - as they are the possessions of 
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individuals.”118  He then differentiates between two types of memory: collected 
and collective.  Collected memory is collectively framed individual memory 
attached to experience, since it is understood that individual memory does not 
occur in a vacuum; however, collective memory is shared memory which is 
detached from personal experience and reattached to an external site, such as 
monuments.  Alaida Assmann differentiates memory into individual, social, 
political, and cultural categories.  Individual and social memory falls under 
Olick’s “collected memory” category, whereas political and cultural memory 
falls under his “collective memory” category.  Specifically, Assmann explains 
that political memory is “how memories are used for political action and the 
formation of group identity” and can be established by certain practices, such 
as the erection of monuments, which stabilize this memory in a way that can be 
passed on over time.119   
Assmann’s categorization of political memory can be further understood 
as the process by which political actors use tools and mechanisms to construct 
memory and therefore create a national narrative in order to facilitate a 
particular national identity construction.  This process is what Jan-Werner Müller 
refers to as collective national memory which best exemplifies the relationship 
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between memory and politics or power.  He explains that “memory itself is a 
kind of ‘symbolic power’, which can be marshaled in much the same way as 
material power.”120  He also establishes two links between memory and power: 
legitimacy and interest.  This study focuses on legitimacy which is how “policies 
are legitimated through appeals to the collective or national memory for social 
consumption both at home and abroad.”121  What Müller calls collective 
national memory, Duncan Bell calls myth.  These myths are “highly simplified 
narratives ascribing fixed and coherent meanings to selected events, people, 
and places, real or imaginary.”122  Bell contends that “the forms assumed by 
mythscapes,” which can include monuments, “are always the result of power, 
and the struggle over interpretation of the past.”123 
Furthermore, there are various ways in which this national political memory 
can be studied: top-down or bottom-up.  According to Assmann, a bottom-up 
approach “looks at individuals in specific historical situations, investigating how 
memories are established and communicated;” whereas, a top-down 
approach “examines collective units… and asks how memories are used for 
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political action and the formation of group identity.”124   
When examining this top-down approach, it is important to look at the 
landscape or sites where power and identity are negotiated.  One such site is 
the monument; however, it is important to first make the distinction between 
monuments and memorials.  Robert Ivy explains that though both monuments 
and memorials involve place as well as remembrance, “fundamentally a 
monument comprises a designed and constructed physical object intended as 
a commemoration;” whereas, memorials “may take on a more ephemeral 
form.”125   
When discussing landscape and sites of memory O’Keefe distinguishes 
between “visual-factual” memories and “sensual-emotional” memories and 
posits that the landscape can be “a touchstone for remembering both.”126  
“Sensual-emotional” memories can be personal experiences of an event; 
whereas “visual-factual” memories can be the external site or political 
representation of the event to the public.  He explains that memories which 
appear or disappear   “do not simply emerge out of thin air… but result directly 
from people’s commemorative decisions and actions as embedded within and 
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constrained by particular sociospatial conditions.”127  Thus, specific memories 
can be constructed at certain sites where commemorative action has been 
taken. 
The Case of the Wilson Monument in Prague: Background and Analysis 
On July 4th, 1928, a statue to the American president Woodrow Wilson was 
unveiled in Prague opposite the Wilson railway station (seen Figures 2 and 3 in 
Appendix).  Beneš, the Foreign Minister, stated at the dedication, “our people 
understood and appreciated President Wilson and his native land… he was for 
a long time their strengthening consolation and hope, their helper and friend, 
and today he will be their model of a citizen and a democrat.”128  Americans of 
Czechoslovak descent raised the money for the statue and a Czech American, 
Albin Polasek, built the statue which was commissioned by the Czechoslovak 
National Council of America.  It is also worth noting that he built the Masaryk 
Memorial in Chicago in 1941.129  At the base of the statue to the deceased 
American president, the inscription stated “The world must be made safe for 
democracy,” a Wilson quote.  On July 4th, 1928 at the unveiling of the statue, the 
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Czechoslovak Deputy Premier “spoke of the nation’s gratefulness to Wilson.”130  
Massive amounts of Czechs in the newly formed Czechoslovakia turned out at 
the unveiling to show their appreciation and enthusiasm for the American 
President (see Figure 1 in Appendix).  However, the statue didn’t remain in place 
for very long and under Nazi occupation this statue was torn down in 1941. 
Ironically, Hitler used Wilson’s self-determination rhetoric when arguing for 
the Sudetenland before and during the Munich Conference.  After taking over 
the Sudetenland due to European appeasement policies, Hitler invaded 
Czechoslovakia and created the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, 
recognizing a separate and truncated Slovak state.  After the United States 
formally declared war on Germany December 11th, 1941, the Nazi leader of the 
Protectorate, Reinhard Heydrich, had the Wilson statue removed and destroyed 
the next day.  At the conclusion of World War II, the plaque with its Wilson quote, 
however, was placed again where the statue had once stood.  Yet again, the 
Soviets, another foreign power whose ideals didn’t line up with Wilson removed 
the plaque after the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948.  In the 
1970s, the Czechoslovak communist regime went one step further and ordered 
that all the original casts be destroyed. 
After the fall of the Czechoslovak communist regime, the founder of 
                                                           
130 Special Cable “Prague Dedicates Wilson Monument,” The New York Times (July 5, 1928). 
76 
 
American Friends of the Czech Republic, Robert Doubek, went to work raising 
the funds and searching for the missing original casts which had reportedly been 
destroyed by the Czechoslovak communist government during the Cold War.  
Miraculously, even after having signed off on destroying the casts, someone 
saved the head and buried it in the national archives.131  Thereafter, the new 
Czech government paid for the base of the statue, and the American Friends of 
the Czech Republic paid for the statue itself.  The replica of the original statue 
was commissioned in 2009 and unveiled in Prague in 2011.  Debbie Komanski, 
executive director of the Albin Polasek Museum stated: 
It’s an extremely, extremely important symbol of 
the friendship between our nations and our 
common commitment to making the world safe 
for democracy.  The Nazis may have destroyed 
it, the Soviets took their shot at it, but it will be 
unveiled again.132 
 
This statue can be seen as a means to bind Czechoslovakia to the United 
States in the memories of the Czechoslovak people in order to create political 
legitimacy.  Müller’s link of memory-power to legitimacy is important for 
understanding the politics behind the Wilson statue.  Not only can policies be 
legitimized through memory, but nations and their relations can be legitimized 
through memory.  In this example, the statue of Wilson in Prague in 1928 not only 
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serves the purpose of legitimizing the new nation of Czechoslovakia, but also 
establishes and legitimizes the relationship between Czechoslovakia and the 
United States of America.  Its reestablishment in 2011 is a continuation of the 
legitimization of the relationship between the newly divorced nation, the Czech 
Republic and the United States.  It was especially important to establish a 
democratic link to the United States after being a communist-ruled state for the 
better part of the late twentieth century.  Thus, the constructed political memory 
of Wilson’s role in the formation of former Czechoslovakia takes physical form in 
this site of his monument.   
Why construct this type of monument in Prague?  Sanford Levinson 
explains that, “changes in political regime often bring with them changes in the 
organization of public space; states always promote privileged narratives of the 
national experience and thus attempt to form a particular kind of national 
consciousness.”133  The Czech elites of 1928 were attempting to do just this 
through a top-down approach where their political actions and legitimacy were 
basically legitimized through the Wilson statue; and thus they were the rightful 
rulers.  While American civil society groups largely funded both versions of the 
statue, the Czech government on both occasions agreed to its placement as a 
way to nurture good Czech-U.S. relations.  As Petrina Dacres asserts, 
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“monuments participate in establishing the legitimacy and authority of the 
state” and are “produced through a process of political negotiations, are 
developed into symbols of cultural solidarity.”134  This monument aided in 
establishing this legitimacy and served as a reminder of that authority. 
The statute also shows how the landscape can be used for political 
means in order to further one interpretation of the past, even at the expense of 
other interpretations.  As Assmann explains, political memory is anchored in the 
material.  Therefore, this statue serves as a site of political memory where 
“policies are legitimated through appeals to the collective or national memory 
for social consumption both at home and abroad.”135  Both in Czechoslovakia, 
and later the Czech Republic, as well as in the United States, this statue is a site 
which ties the Czech people to the American people.  In addition, it connects 
the Czechs to the American democratic tradition and the principles which 
Wilson held.  It also holds special meaning for descendents of Bohemia living in 
the United States which see this site of memory as a link to their ancestors’ 
homeland.   
On the other hand, the statue could have been unveiled in 1928 as a 
response to the growing uncertainty in the world around them.  Indeed, during 
the unveiling, sentiments were expressed such as the hope that “Wilson’s 
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idealism would one day be realized despite the war’s aftermath of dictatorships 
which prevail in parts of Europe;” and, “as long as the hodgepodge map of 
Europe remains as it is, there will always be one little country where nothing but 
praise will be said for America’s war-time President.”136 Therefore, this monument 
could also serve to bind the Czechoslovak-American relations in the memories 
of Americans as well.  There was legitimate fear and uncertainty about the 
future of Czechoslovakia, and thus the Czech elites may have attempted to 
bind the political memories of these two nations in the hope of future favorable 
political action. 
Another interesting aspect of the Wilson monument was its removal by 
Reinhard Heydrich during the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia.  Altering 
landscape isn’t just about what kind of political memory to impose, but also 
about what kind of memory to forget.  As Levinson explains, “those who 
overthrow regimes often take as one of their first tasks the physical destruction of 
symbols – and the latent power possessed by these markers – of those whom 
they have displaced.”137  Therefore, the removal of the Wilson monument by 
Heydrich attests to the actual power of this monument in the Czech political-
national memory.  
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International Relations and Memory? 
In a lecture in 2005, the Czech ambassador to the United States, Martin 
Palouš, “traced current relations back to the end of the First World War when the 
United States ‘helped decisively with the creation of a democratic 
Czechoslovakia,’ and he continually referenced the need to build upon those 
foundations in the pursuit of a continued relationship.”138  Then on September 
8th, 2011, a new statue of Wilson was raised in the same location as the old 
statue.   
At the unveiling of the new statue in 2011, the Czech ambassador to the 
United States, Petr Gandalovic stated that the statue is “an opportunity to 
commemorate the importance of the United States of America in the creation 
of independent Czechoslovakia.”139  Prominent Czech magazines such as 
Prague Leaders Magazine, the Prague Monitor, the Prague Post, and Radio 
Prague all covered the resurrection of the statue and its subsequent unveiling.  
Prague Leaders Magazine even placed a clip of the unveiling and the 
weeklong festivities surrounding the event on its YouTube channel.140  The 
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interesting thing about the 2011 unveiling of the Wilson statue on YouTube is that 
it shows the popular enthusiasm and large crowds which appeared for the 
statue’s unveiling.  As a result of its presence on the internet, this production and 
interpretation of the past won’t go away any time soon.  
The United States Embassy in Prague also posted a clip on YouTube of 
Ambassador Norman Eisen speaking at the unveiling in which he states that the 
statue is “not only a physical structure, but also a monument in [the Czech 
people’s] hearts.”141  He goes on to state that the monument is indicative of the 
close ties between the United States and the Czech Republic and symbolizes 
the many immigrants from Bohemia to the United States.  Essentially, 
Ambassador Eisen enumerates the myth of the statue and the political-symbolic 
importance for both the Czech peoples and the American peoples today.  Thus 
this resurrected statue of Wilson is furthering the myth of the creation of 
Czechoslovakia and the myth of Wilson in the Czech Republic itself as well as 
presents the Czech Republic as a distinctly Western state which is perpetuated 
by both the Czech government and immigrant groups in the United States. 
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As Müller states, “memory is not a vessel of truth or a mirror of interests, but 
a process of constructing meaning.”142  This meaning can take a variety of forms 
such as monuments and can be a place where nationhood is legitimized and 
national-identity is constructed and shared.  It can also be a place to attempt 
to influence relationships between countries by linking the two based on shared 
democratic values and historical circumstances.  The Wilson statue is a site of 
ongoing political and national memory construction with numerous layers which 
are as telling about Czech national identity and politics as they are about 
Czech-American foreign relation strategies. 
 
                                                           
142 Müller, Memory, 30. 
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Conclusion and Consequences for Today 
 
The communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 marked the beginning 
of another chapter in Czech-American relations; however, it proved to be much 
more limited than before.  The CNCA was initially active in lobbying the United 
States government to liberate Czechoslovakia from the communists.  Yet the 
émigré organization began to disintegrate shortly thereafter due to infighting as 
to what course of action the Council should take.  A much smaller Council 
began to help Czech expatriates find places in the United States to live and 
work.  This phase consisted mostly of Czech-Americans financially helping 
Czechs who wanted to leave their now communist-ruled country.   
There were still other civil society groups of Czech descent in the United 
States, some of which exist in the present; what follows are just a few of the 
many.  The American Fund for Czechoslovak Relief (AFoCR) was established in 
1948 to provide aid and relief to Czechoslovakia during communism.  This group 
terminated its activities in 1990.  The American Friends of the Czech Republic 
(AFoCR) states on the website that its mission is to: “foster[] closer ties between 
the United States and the Czech Republic in the areas of business, trade, 
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culture, education, diplomacy, and security.”143  This organization was also 
responsible for building the Masaryk Memorial in Washington, D.C., the re-
erection of the Wilson Statue in Prague, as well as financially assisting the Czech 
Republic after the floods of 2002.  It also supported the entry of the Czech 
Republic into NATO.  
 The Council of Free Czechoslovakia, formed in 1949, became the Czech 
and Slovak Solidarity Council in 1994 after the Velvet Divorce to promote good 
relations between the Czechs and Slovaks.  The Wilsonian Club, founded in 1949 
by Czech-  and Slovak-Americans originally commemorated the memory and 
legacy of Wilson in his part of the independence of Czechoslovakia.  Today its 
goal is to commemorate his legacy all over the world.  
 Aside from these groups, there has been collaboration between the 
Czech Republic and the United States on several occasions.  Politically, the 
Czech Republic was a staunch supporter of the United States during the Iraq 
invasion and during the war on terror.  Most recently, a fertilizer plant exploded 
in the town of West, Texas.  Devastated by the explosion, West, inhabited 
primarily by people of Czech descent, was initially denied FEMA assistance.   
As a result of the destruction, the Czech Republic stepped in to help by 
                                                           
143 “Mission,” American Friends of the Czech Republic, accessed on January 15, 2014, 
http://www.afocr.org/mission. 
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approving the donation of $200,000 to the town of West.  The Czech 
ambassador to the United States, Petr Gandalovič “travelled to West 
immediately after the explosion to personally express his condolences to those 
affected by the blast.”144 He even remarked that in the Czech Republic, “this 
story is the NO.1 news item and tops social media discussions.”145  It is easy to 
see how, to this day, the legacy and memory of Czech-American cooperation 
based on Wilson and Czech immigrants still permeates the relationship between 
these two nations.   
In the end, the words of President Tomáš Masaryk still ring true in the 
Czech Republic:  
Your name, Mr. President, as you have no doubt 
read, is openly cheered in the streets of Prague – 
our nation will forever be grateful to you and to 
the people of the United States.  And we know 
how to be grateful.  Believe me, Mr. President, 
Yours very sincerely.  Th. G. Masaryk146 
 
Woodrow Wilson’s legitimization of the Czechs claim to self-determination during 
                                                           
144 “Explosion in West, Tx – Czech Government Approves Aid,” Embassy of the Czech Republic in 
Washington, D.C., accessed on January 15, 2014, 
https://www.mzv.cz/washington/en/czech_u_s_relations/news/explosion_at_a_plant_in_west_tx.
html; B.C., “The Czech Roots of a Town in Texas,” The Economist Blogs, accessed on January 15, 
2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/04/czech-republic-and-
america. 
145 Jessica Ravitz, “Town Devastated by Fertilizer Explosion is Guided by the West Way,” CNN, 
accessed on January 15, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/24/us/west-texas-profile. 
146 Kovtun, Masark & America, 59. 
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World War I, established the United States president’s role in the creation of 
Czechoslovakia regardless of any misgivings he may have had during the 
process.  The success of the Czech nationalists and Czech immigrant civil society 
groups in using historic right to achieve foreign and domestic policy aims is 
unique; however, the legacy of Woodrow Wilson as he lives on in Czech politics 
is also exceptional in history.  This legacy can be seen through the case of the 
Wilson Monument in Prague and its resilience as a symbol of democratic 
freedom to the Czech people.
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure 1 - Czech crowds at the original Wilson statue’s unveiling in 1928.147 
 
 
                                                           
147 The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/prague-to-honor-woodrow-
wilson-with-new-statue-at-main-train-station/2011/09/29/gIQAeghoLL_story.html. 
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Figure 2 - 2011 Wilson statue in Prague148 
 
Figure 3 - 2011 Wilson statue in Prague149 
 
Figure 4 - Tomáš Masaryk and Woodrow Wilson on a Czech postcard (Personal 
Collection) 
                                                           
148 US Embassy, http://prague.usembassy.gov/woodrow-wilson-monument-unveiled-in-
prague.html. 
149 American Friends of the Czech Republic, http://www.afocr.org/wilson-monument-and-tg-
masaryk-memorial. 
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Figure 5 - Woodrow Wilson and Tomáš Masaryk on a Czech postcard (Personal 
Collection) 
 
 
Figure 6 - Tomáš Masaryk and Woodrow Wilson on a Czech postcard 
commemorating the relationship between the newly formed Czechoslovakia 
and the United States. (Personal Collection) 
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Figure 7 - Woodrow Wilson and family on a Czech postcard (Personal Collection) 
 
 
Figure 8 - Edward Benes and Tomáš Masaryk on a Czech postcard after the Nazi 
takeover of the Czech Republic (Personal Collection) 
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Figure 9 - Tomáš Masaryk (Personal Collection) 
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Figure 10 - Tomáš Masaryk as a young man (Personal Collection) 
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Figure 11 - Tomáš Masaryk (Personal Collection) 
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